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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK E. DOUGLAS, and 
DRUE E. DOUGLAS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
- vs.-
R. C. DUV ALI_j, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
8484 
Appellants' Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an Appeal from a verdict of a jury rendered 
in the above entitled cause on the 3rd of November, 1955. 
The action was originally commenced by Appellants 
against Respondent to recover damages which the Plain-
tiffs claimed resulted from the false and fraudulent 
representations of the Defendant. The Defendant, R. C. 
Duvall, is the President of the Ogden First Federal 
Savings & Loan Association and a director of the Com-
mercial Security Bank. He has been engaged in the 
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savings and loan business in Ogden for approximately 
20 years. Prior to the time of his coming to Ogden, he 
had . experience in oil and gas operations ( Tr. 94). Some 
years prior to 1950 Mr. Duvall became interested in a 
mining prospect in Southwestern Idaho known as the 
Sundance Mine. For several years exploratory work 
":as done by Mr. Duvall and two associates, !ir. Froerer 
and J1r. Barrett. In the summer and fall of 1949 a Mr. 
Roger Pierce, a mining engineer, was employed to make 
a survey and report on the ore located on the property. 
Mr. Pierce submitted his report on or about January, 
1950 (Tr. 96) in which he stated that results of diamond 
drilling ''indica ted large widths of mineralization that 
for the most part assayed too low to be of commercial 
value.'' He further reported that, based upon other 
information, including information obtained from tunnel-
ing he would conclude that ''including the area developed 
and reasonable extensions beyond developed phases, 
there is indica ted 200,000 tons of provable and probable 
ore reserves having a value of about $7.00 a ton." (Tr. 
96) On a basis of 90 per cent recoYery, :Jir. Pierce stated 
that Mr. Duvall should expert to be able to realize 
approximately $6.30 per ton out of the ore and that 
actual mining costs should amount to about $1.75 per 
ton and milling costs 90e per ton. This eost, together 
with a royalty of 10 per cent payable to the land owner 
( 63c per ton), 'Yould make a mining cost of $3.28 per 
ton (Tr. 97). No report 'Yas made or estimate given on 
general overhead or operating and managerial costs. 
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Thereafter, in March of 1950 Mr. Duvall and his 
associates organized a corporation for the purpose of 
engaging in mining the properties which then became 
known as the Duvall Mine. At the time of incorporation, 
1Ir. Duvall claimed to have put into the properties about 
$16,000.00 in development and exploration ( Tr. 428). 
The properties were turned into the Corporation at a 
value of $700,000.00 and stock issued to Mr. Duvall and 
his family of a par value of $480,000.00. No actual cash 
was paid into the Corporation by any of the incorpora-
tors. (Exh. K) 
About the time of the incorporation, Mr. Duvall 
called Appellant Frank Douglas, a practicing dentist in 
Ogden, to Duvall's office at the Ogden First Federal 
Savings & Loan Association and, as a result of the 
representations made to Douglas and his wife, induced 
them to loan to the Duvall Company the sum of $20,000.00 
(Tr. 23-32). In order to advance the money to the Duvall 
Mining Company, Dr. and Mrs. Douglas borrowed 
$20,000.00 and a note was signed by Mr. Duvall on behalf 
of the Duvall Mining Company on a form used by the 
Ogden First Federal in the amount of such loan. In 
addition to giving the note, Mr. Duvall also transferred 
to the Douglases 2400 shares of the capital stock of the 
Duvall Mining Company (Tr. 66). 
Subsequent thereto the Douglases from time to time 
advanced to the Duvall Mining Company various sums 
of money until the total of $57,686.20 was loaned. In the 
fall of 1950 $686.20 was advanced on a purported assess-
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ment of stock for which a note was taken. In December 
of 1950 a loan of $15,000.00 was made. At this time, in 
order to obtain the funds to make the loan Dr. and Mrs. 
Douglas had to mortgage their home, which they did to 
the Ogden First Federal at the instance of Mr. Duvall. 
During the interim, considerable improvements had been 
made at the mine by the construction of facilities for 
mining and milling the ore. The mine itself went into 
production about September 1, 1950. During its opera-
tion in 1950 and part of 1951 the mine was under the 
direction of ~fr. ~Iiles P. Romney, who prior to his asso-
ciation with the Duvall ~fining Company was employed 
by the United States Smelting, Refining and Mining 
Company. He also had assisted in the examination of 
the properties by Mr. Pierce (Tr. 308), and directed the 
construction of the Mill in the spring of 1950 (Tr. 315). 
The mining operations closed down about the 30th of 
November, 1950 (Tr. 316), at which time :Jir. Romney 
gave to Mr. Duvall a written report showing the results 
of operations from September to December, including 
amount of ore produced, gold recoYery therefrom, cost 
of production, and loss on operation (Exhibits Hand I). 
The information contained in this report, however, was 
available to Mr. Duvall before the report -was made, 
since l\I r. Du\'all \Yas in close contact "~ith the mining 
operation, kne\Y the amount of tonnage being produced, 
and value of the gold content thereof, and the actual 
amount of gold recovered ( Tr. 102, 103). He ";as also 
aequainted with the costs of operations, issued the checks 
in payment of the bills, and was a\Yare in the latter part 
of November and first part of December that there had 
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been a considerable loss in operations and that it would 
be necessary to obtain from $15,000.00 to $25,000.00 to 
pay the outstanding bills on the operation ( Tr. 492). 
This \Vas the situation in Dec.ember 1950 when Dr. 
and Mrs. Douglas were again asked by Mr. Duvall to 
loan some money to the mining company, but no refer-
ence to the actual financial situation was made by l\Ir. 
Duvall when he approached the Douglases on the matter 
of a further loan. 
Again, in l\Iay of 1951, shortly after operations com-
menced in that year, Dr. Douglas, at the request of Mr. 
Duvall, loaned the company $5,000.00 which he obtained 
by increasing the mortgage on the home, which in the 
meantime had been reduced by substantial payments 
thereon. In the late fall of 1951 Dr. Douglas was able 
to discharge the mortgage at the bank and within a few 
days thereafter he was again approached by Mr. Duvall 
to loan the company additional money and to re-mortgage 
his home for that purpose. This was done, and on Decem-
ber 26, 1951 a further loan of $15,000.00 was made. A 
month or two prior to making this loan Dr. Douglas read 
an article in the Ogden Standard Examiner concerning 
the purported rich gold deposit being operated by the 
Duvall Mining Company (Tr. 41). This article appears 
as Exhibit G, and gives similar information to that 
claimed by Appellants to have been given by Mr. Duvall 
when the first loan was made. The information for the 
article and accompanying pictures 'vere furnished by 
Mr. Duvall ( Tr. 120, 121). 
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The last loan was made in July of 1952, when Appel-
lants withdrew $2,000.00 from their childrens' savings 
accounts in the Ogden First Federal Savings & Loan 
Association and loaned that to the Duvall Company, 
thereby making a total of $57,686.20 loaned by them to 
the Duvall Company over the period of time involved. 
The Duvall ~fine continued to operate in the year 
1951 from early spring until late fall and also in the year 
1952. However, value of the ore mined continued to be 
considerably less than $7.00 per ton; and the costs of 
production, including general overhead costs and mana-
gerial salaries, exceeded the amount received from the 
ore by $2.00 to $7.00 per ton. The production figures 
(Exhibit ~1:) show that in 1950, 4,491 tons of ore were 
produced, from which $8,767.67 was received or $1.95 
per ton. During the same period of time costs of pro-
duction were $42,620.81 for a cost of $9.41 per ton, 
making a net loss of $7.54 per ton. Thus, the more ore 
the company attempted to produce, the greater its total 
loss became, although in the year 1953 it was able to 
reduce the loss per ton to $2.40. 
In the fall of 1953 "ithin a fe"~ days after having 
met Dr. Douglas on the street and telling him that every-
thing was doing fine, the company had made a substantial 
profit for the year, that all debts had been paid, and that 
everything ""as in readiness to return some of the money 
to the investors; 1\Ir. Duvall called a meeting and 
announced that they 'vere through (Tr. 56). By that 
time the company had mined a total of 113,409 tons of 
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ore at a loss of $379,756.31 (Exhibit L). According to 
Mr. Duvall, there was no further ore of commercial value 
left; that diamond drilling had disclosed the ore to be 
of too low a value to be mined commercially ( Tr. 138). 
(This was the same conclusion which had been given by 
~Ir. Pierce and Romney in respect to the diamond drill-
ing which had been done in the summer of 1949.) 
Dr. Douglas, claiming that he relied upon the rep-
resentations made by Mr. Duvall in the spring of 1950, 
and upon the statements made and the information given 
subsequently, and having no information concerning the 
actual financial condition of the company and its losses 
during the time that the loans were made, commenced 
this action against Mr. Duvall alleging in his Complaint 
that the amounts loaned by plaintiff and his wife were 
as a result of false and fraudulent representations made 
to them by Mr. Duvall. The action was tried in Ogden, 
Utah, before a jury. At the conclusion of the trial the 
Court submitted to the jury 54 written interrogatories 
to be answered, and which required every interrogatory 
to be answered in the affirmative in order for the Plain-
tiff to recover. After several hours of deliberation, the 
jury answered all of the interrogatories except the last 
one in the negative. These interrogatories were the 
same as to each of the six different loans or advances 
made and were as follows: 
'' 1. Were the representations or any of them 
made "\vhen and as alleged o? 
' ' 2. Were such representations, if any you 
find, concerning a presently existing, material 
fact~ 
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'' 3. Were such representations (if any you 
find) false' 
'' 4. Did the defendant then and there· know 
that said representations (if any you find) were 
false or make such statements recklessly knowing 
that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to 
base such positive assertions, if any were made 1 
'' 5. Were such false representations (if any 
you find) made by the defendant for the purpose 
of inducing the plaintiffs to act on the same~ 
'' 6. Did the plaintiffs act reasonably and in 
ignorance of the falsity of said representations 
(if any you find) ~ 
'' 7. Did the plaintiffs in fact rely on said 
representations (if any you find)? 
'' 8. Were the plaintiffs then, there and there-
by induced to act by parting with their money~ 
'' 9. How much by "\Yay of money damages, if 
any you find, did plaintiffs sustain by reason of 
the arts and conduct of the defendant.'' (R. 82-87) 
In preparing for the argument of the case to the 
jury counsel for Appellant obtained a transcript of a 
portion of the testimony of the Defendant Duvall, in-
tending to read to the jury the testimony of ~ir. Duvall 
with respect to the alleged representations made by him 
to the Douglases. ''Then counsel for Appellants an-
nounced to the jury that he expected to read the actual 
testimony, Defense c~ounsel objected, w·hereupon the 
Court sustained the objection and refused to allo"r 
counsel for Appellants to read such portion of the 
transcript. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
In connection with this Appeal, Appellants cite as 
error the action of the trial court in submitting the case 
to the jury on special interrogatories, claiming that 
various instructions and comments of the Court were 
improper, as well as refusing to allow counsel to read 
a portion of the transcript of the testimony. The points 
relied upon by Appellants for reversal of the judgment 
and the matters which are claimed to be error on the 
part of the trial court are as follows: 
1. The court erred in submitting the matter to the 
jury on written interrogatories. 
2. The court erred in instructing the jury that it 
was necesary for them to find the claimed representations 
to have been made as and when alleged in the Complaint, 
without advising the jury that such representations could 
be proved in substance and effect. 
3. The court erred in refusing to instruct the jury 
that when a representation was made, if any should be 
found by the jury, it could thereafter be relied upon as 
a continuing statement of fact with the same force and 
effect until it was known or should have been known to 
the Plaintiffs that such representation was in fact false. 
4. The court erred in instructing the jury in effect 
that Dr. Douglas was a director and as such had knowl-
edge of the affairs of the Duvall Company. (Tr. 575) 
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5. The court erred in commenting on the weight of 
the evidence in stating to the jury, ''I charge you that 
a man can't plug up his ears and not observe what a 
reasonable person should observe and not learn what the 
reasonable person should learn and not hear what was 
said, if anything was said, concerning the operation of 
this company." (Tr. 575) 
6. The court erred in commenting to the jury, "Now, 
if you find that something like that happened, of the 
nature that a reasonable man ought to act on, then you 
can't award judgment on some representation, because 
a man can't blow hot and cold. He either relies or he 
doesn't rely, and he sees the sun come up in the morning 
or he doesn't see the sun come up in the morning. If he 
hears certain things he hears certain things, and if he 
sees a report he sees a report, and he is charged with 
'vhat 's in there." (Tr. 576) 
7. The court erred in refusing to allow counsel to 
read a portion of the transcript of the testimony in the 
closing argument. 
8. In any event the court erred in failing to direct 
a verdict in whole or in part for the Plaintiffs in con-
nection with their Complaint. 
The foregoing statement of points 'vill be consoli-
dated for the purpose of argument into the following 
propositions : 
10 
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I 
The court erred in submitting the matter to the jury 
upon special interrogatories. 
II 
The court erred in its instructions to the jury. 
III 
The court erred in commenting upon the evidence 
during the course of its Instructions. 
IV 
The court erred in refusing to allow counsel to read 
from a transcript of the testimony in closing argument. 
v 
The court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in 
favor of the Plaintiffs upon all of part of Plaintiffs' 
complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE 
MATTER TO THE JURY UPON SPECIAL INTER-
ROGATORIES. 
It is significant in this case that because the matter 
was one involving an action for fraud, that at the outset 
Plaintiffs had the responsibility of proving such fraud 
by clear and convincing evidence. Too, there were six 
11 
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different transactions in which the Plaintiffs had loaned 
or advanced money to the Duvall Company at the in-
stance and request of the Defendant Duvall so that 
insofar as attempting to present the matter to the jury 
upon special intorrogatories the court was under the 
responsibility clearly and specifically to define the issues 
to the jury and to take from them all matters which in 
any event "\vould not be material for them to consider. 
For instance, if the case \Yere to be submitted prop-
erly to the jury upon interrogatories the court should 
have instructed the jury as a matter of law, that if they 
found that the Defendant represented to the Plaintiff 
that not less than 300,000 tons of ore had been blocked 
out, such representation was a false representation. The 
report of ~Ir. Pierce, which had been written up as a 
result of his survey of the property and tunneling, clearly 
states that not to exceed 200,000 tons of ore was blocked 
out, including both the proven and probable reserves 
(Tr. 96). Nor does the evidence disclose that such report 
was made as a result of diamond drilling, although Plain-
tiffs claimed that the Defendant represented to them that 
the ore which was proven and blocked out \vas ascertained 
as a result of diamond drilling. Obviously, use of the 
phrase ''diamond drilling'' "Tould be more persuasive 
in indicating that there ''Tas no question \Yith respect to 
the nature and extent of surh ore than to say the only 
basis for concluding there \Vas a quantity of ore blocked 
out \Yas as a result of tunneling or snrYey. The very fact 
that in the operation of the mine no ore of commercial 
value was produeed and only a totnl of 113,409 tons of 
12 
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ore were mined is indicative of the fact that without 
diamond drilling it was impossible to determine the 
extent of the ore body. Of further significance is the 
fact that the original diamond drilling done, and which 
was referred to by Mr. Pierce in his report, disclosed that 
there was no ore of commercial quantity or value on the 
property. Notwithstanding the foregoing undisputed 
evidence the court submitted to the jury not only whether 
the statement claimed by the Plaintiff to have been made 
by the Defendant that no less than 300,000 tons of ore 
had been blocked out as a result of diamond drilling was 
in fact made, but also whether such statement was false. 
The manner in which the interrogatories were 
phrased would indicate that the jury was to answer 
whether any particular representation concerned a pres-
ently existing material fact or was false only if the jury 
should first find that a representation was made. All of 
the questions following Interrogatory Number 1 are 
conditioned upon the jury finding that a representation 
was made. Therefore, in answering the interrogatories 
subsequent to Number 1 the jury must have determined 
that certain representations were made by the Defendant 
to the Plaintiffs as alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
Although written interrogatories are specifically 
authorized under the provisions of Rule 49, U.R.C.P., 
\vi thin the trial court's discretion, nevertheless it has 
been held that answers to such interrogatories cannot 
be inconsistent. In 53 Am. Jur. TRIAL, Section 1082, 
p. 750 appears the following statement: 
13 
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''Inconsistent and conflicting findings in 
special verdicts and answers to interrogatories 
neutralize each other and must be disregarded. 
rrherefore, if findings are made which are contra-
dictory as to material facts, such facts are left 
undetermined and since it is not the province of 
the court, unless by consent, to determine them 
no judgment can be rendered.'' ' 
In the case of Great Western Land and Improvement 
Co. v. Sandygren, 141 Wn. 451, 252 Pac. 123, the Plain-
tiff company sought to recover on two promissory notes 
executed by Defendant to a C. W. Brockman and by him 
transferred to a bank which in turn negotiated the notes 
to the Plaintiff. The Defendant contended that the notes 
were given as a rE!sult of false and fraudulent represen-
tations and that the Plaintiff acquired the notes with 
knowledge of the fraud. At the -conclusion of the trial 
the jury returned a general verdict in favor of Defend-
ant, at the same time answering certain interrogatories. 
Questions 3, 4 and 5, " .. ith the answers, were as follows: 
''Special Verdict No. 3. If you answer special 
Verdict No. 1 in the affirmati\e state if the First 
Exchange N atioual Bank of Coeur d ' .... 1\_lene, Idaho, 
purchased said notes in good faith ..... \.nswer: No. 
''Special Verdict No. 4. If you ans,ver special 
, .. erdirt No. 1 in the affirmatiYe, state if the First 
Exchange N a tiona! Bank of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, 
had at the time of purchase any notice of any 
alleged false and fraudulent representations made 
hv Brockman to the defendant bv "'"hich she was 
. . 
indueed to sign the notes. .A .. us,Yer: No. 
'' Sperinl Verdict No. 5. If you answer Special 
Verdict No. 4 in the negative, then answer if the 
14 
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plaintiff was a party to any fraud or illegality 
affecting these notes~ Answer : Yes.'' 
In considering the effect of these answers, the 
court held: 
''Special Verdict No. 3, that the Idaho bank 
did not purchase the notes in good faith, is not 
inconsistent with the general verdict in favor of 
Mrs. Sandygren. That special verdict, standing 
alone, supports the general verdict. 
"Special Verdict No. 4, that the Idaho bank, 
at the time of purchasing the notes, had no notice 
of any alleged false and fraudulent representa-
tions made by Brockman to Mrs. Sandygren by 
which she was induced to sign the notes, is incon-
sistent vvith the general verdict in favor of Mrs. 
Sandygren. That special verdict, standing alone, 
would call for the judgment which was rendered 
in favor of the improvement company notwith-
standing the general verdict in favor of Mrs. 
Sandygren. 
''Special Verdict No. 5 has no other effect than 
to place the improvement company in the shoes 
of the Idaho bank ; that is, to render the improve-
ment company chargeable with notice of infirmi-
ties in the notes as the Idaho bank was so charged. 
"It seems to us that these considerations call 
for the conclusion that the improvement company 
is not entitled to judgments upon the notes not-
withstanding the general verdict in favor of Mrs. 
Sandygren, because special verdict No. 4, upon 
which such judgment must rest, is plainly nega-
tived by special verdict No. 3. In other words, 
reading these two special verdicts together, they 
do not clearly show the improvement company 
entitled to judgments notwithstanding the general 
'15 
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verdict. They are so contradictory as to destroy 
each other in so far as either lends support to 
judgments in favor of the improvement company. 
We are therefore of the opinion that the trial 
court was in error in rendering judgments in 
favor of the improvement company upon the 
theory that the special verdicts call for such judg-
ments notwithstanding the general verdict. 
''It seems to us that :Jirs. Sandygren must also 
fail in her claim for judgments in her favor upon 
the general verdict, since special verdict No. 4 
negatives her right in that behalf, though special 
verdict No. 3 supports her claim in that behalf. 
There is a sense in which these two special ver-
dicts may be considered as destroying each other. 
They do have that effect in so far as either can 
be the basis, standing alone, of any judgment for 
or against either of the parties to this action. But 
we think special verdict No. 4 also destroys the 
effect of the general verdict in favor of Mrs. 
Sandygren. For, manifestly, if the notes were 
purchased by the Idaho bank without notice of 
the alleged false and fraudulent representations 
made by Brockman to :Jirs. Sandygren inducing 
her to execute them, the general verdict in her 
favor could not lJaYe been correctly rendered by 
the jury. Noting this inco1zsistcncy between spe-
c£al verd z:ct l\' o. 4 and the general verdict, and the 
inconsistency betu,een special rerdict No. 3 and 
s JJecial rerdict No. 4, it is pla·in, 1re think, that 
the Jury d1~d not at all co'niJ>t"ehen-d the issues in 
the case, and that therefore Jlrs. Sa1zdygren, as 
'lrrll as the in1proren1cnt co1npany, is 11of entitled 
to jnd/ln1rnt iu her favot" upon the general -'Cerdict. 
'~rhe problem is an in,TolYed one by reason of this 
double inconsistenr~T· We do not deem it necessary 
t.o ht~re 11otire the numerous decisions of the courts 
touching the general subject. In 38 Cyc. 1926, a.nd 
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27 R.C.L. 879, are found observations which we 
regard as lending support to our conclusion th~t 
no judgment can be rightfully rendered upon this 
record in favor of either the improvement com-
pany or 1\Irs. Sandygren. 
''What then shall we do with the case~ The 
answer to this question, we think, is found in the 
fact that the case remains undisposed of, and 
without a record enabling the superior court or 
this court to lawfully pronounce a final judgment 
for or against either of the parties. This mani-
festly means that the case should be regarded as 
still pending and undisposed of, and that there-
fore a new trial should be directed; this regard-
less of want of timely motion by either party in 
that behalf." (Italics added) 
Again in the case of Porter vs. Western N. C. Rail-
way Company, 97 N.C. 66, 2 S.E. 580, the court held that 
the jury's answers to special interrogatories were incon-
sistent, requiring a new trial. There the jury answered 
''no'' in response to the question, ''Did Plaintiff inte-
state contribute to his own injury by his negligence.'' 
The jury also answered ''yes'' to the question, ''Did 
Plaintiff's intestate know that the locomotive engineer 
whose carelessness caused the accident was incompetent, 
inefficient and careless in the operation of the engine." 
In Raymond v. Keseberg, 84 Wis. 302, 54 N.W. 612, 
the court held that a special finding by the jury that an 
abutting owner did not use ordinary care and prudence 
to prevent injury to travelers on the highway would not 
justify a verdict against such owner without any finding 
that injury to a traveler resulted from such failure where 
another special finding held that the injury complained 
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of was caused by the negligence of the city alone. This, 
even though it was apparent that the city's negligence 
must have been that of the abutting owner also. 
The impropriety of the court in the instant case is 
further emphasized by the failure and refusal to take 
from the jury any of the elements which must be estab-
lished in order to prove fraud. Although our Supreme 
Court has in the past outlined nine elements of fraud, 
the evidence of this case would not justify the submis-
sion of each of those elements to the jury. There was 
certainly no issue on whether the Plaintiff relied upon 
the alleged representations in making the loans to the 
Duvall Company. He testified that he did and there is 
no evidence to contradict such (Tr. 32). Likewise, there 
could be no contention but that the claimed representa-
tion that 300,000 tons of ore had been blocked out as a 
result of diamond drilling was a representation of a 
presently existing material fact. 
Another reason for pointing out the above incon-
sistency on the part of the trial court is to emphasize 
that the case here in question was not one which should 
have been submitted to the jury upon special interroga-
tories unless the same "~ere simplified and reduced to a 
limited n urn ber actually applying to the issue of fact in 
the case. Obviously, counsel for Respondent will urge 
that because the ans"Ters to the first interrogatory (as 
to "·hether or not such representation \Yas made) were 
all in the negative would thereby make it unnecessary 
to determine \\rhether it \vas error on the part of the 
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court to submit the additional interrogatories. In 
answer to such a proposition, we respectfully submit 
that the answers to the subsequent interrogatories indi-
cate that the jury must have concluded that representa-
tions were in fact made in order to answer such ques-
tions. While the court in effect instructed the jury that 
unless they found a representation to have been made 
to the Plaintiff as alleged in the Complaint, it would not 
be necessary for them to consider any further questions, 
the jury, nevertheless, did proceed to answer subsequent 
questions as though such representations were made. 
Another reason for assigning as error the action of 
the trial court in submitting the matter to the jury on 
special interrogatories lies in the lack of complete and 
adequate instructions on the subject matter in issue-
the alleged fraud of the Defendant. In 24 Am. Jur. 
FRAUD AND DECEIT, Sec. 299, p. 147, is set forth the 
general rule governing instructions in cases of this kind, 
as follows: 
''The general rules governing the form and 
sufficiency of instructions and the necessity for 
and propriety of giving them are, of course, 
applicable in actions based on fraud. The court 
is not permitted to invade the province of the jury 
in deciding disputed matters of fact in reference 
to the fraud charged under the guise of instruct-
ing them. The purpose of instructing the jury is 
to enlighten them by giving them a stalement of 
the propositions of law applicable to the issues 
to be decided. Hence, the primary requisite of 
instructions is that they be correct in substance. 
Accordingly, the instructions relative to frarud 
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should be correct front the standpoint of the lOJW 
of fraurl arnd deceit, and an objection may be prop-
~rly ':rged against any instruction which is faulty 
In this respect, even to the extent of securing a 
reversal on appeal if the error appears in the 
record and is prejudicial and the party complain-
ing of the error has not estopped himself by 
having taken upon the trial the same position as 
that expressed by the court in the instruction.'' 
(Italics added) 
In the instant matter, Plaintiff requested several 
instructions \vhich the court refused under the guise that 
such instructions ·w·ere ''not appropriate to a special 
verdict'' (R. 34). Such an instruction requested by the 
Plaintiff, and which was not only proper but should have 
been given regardless of whether special interrogatories 
were submitted to the jury, reads as follows: 
' 'You are instructed that in determining 
whether or not the plaintiffs, in this case, were 
induced to advance money to the Duvall Corpora-
tion by reason of the representations of the de-
fendant, you may take into consideration the 
position of the defendant in respect to the plain-
tiffs, his position and standing in the community, 
the nature of the business and actiYities in which 
he "'as engaged, the position he occupied with 
respect to the DnYall ('~orporation, and all facts 
and circumstances \Yhich you may determine ha\e 
a bearing on the relationship of the parties to this 
action.'' 
Like,Yise, l:>laintiffs ~ Requested Instruction No. 4 
\vas refused, although it should have been given to the 
jury as a part of the gt•neral instructions: 
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''You are instructed that a bad motive is not 
an essential element of fraud, and, therefore, in 
this case, plaintiffs are not required to prove that 
the defendant had a bad motive in order to recover 
from the defendant on plaintiffs' complaint.'' 
Failure of the court to give these requested instruc-
tions, and each of them, was excepted to by Plaintiff ( Tr. 
595). Attention of the court "\vas called to the fact that 
not .only had the instructions as requested been refused 
but that no instruction covering the same subject matter 
had been given. 
Thus the entire manner in "\vhich the rase was sub-
mitted to the jury "\vas sufficiently confusing that it is 
impossible to say what the jury would or would not have 
done in respect to the rna tter if the case had been sub-
mitted to them properly, either upon a general verdict 
or upon limited number of special interrogatories de-
signed to elicit answers with respect to the issues of 
fact only and the jury had answered them consistently. 
We respectfully submit in this case the use of the special 
interrogatories only confused the jury in respect to the 
issues before them and resulted in the Plaintiffs not 
having a fair and impartial trial and leaves the issue 
of whether the defendant made false and fraudulent 
representations to the plaintiffs undecided. 
II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS 
TO THE JURY. 
Appellants claim that the court committed several 
errors in respect to the instructions given to the jury. 
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In the first place, the court required the jury to find if 
any of the representations were made ''when and as 
alleged," (R. 82). As indicated above, one of the chief 
representations claimed to have been made to him by 
the Defendant was that 300,000 tons of ore had been 
blocked out as a result of diamond drilling .. The jury 
might well have considered that the representation that 
300,000 tons of ore was blocked out was made, but 
answered the interrogatory in the negative because the 
other portion of the statement that it ·was a result of 
diamond drilling had not been made. Or, the jury may 
have considered that the representation was made that 
the amount of ore which the Plaintiff claimed the De-
fendant represented had been blocked out was approxi-
mately 300,000 tons whereas the Complaint referred to 
the representation that it was not less than 300,000 tons. 
In either event, the jury should have answered that a 
representation was made, although made in substanc-e 
and effect. 
We submit that the court should have instructed the 
jury to answer the Interrogatory numbered 1 in the 
affirmative if they found that either or all of the repre-
sentations claimed to have been made w·ere made in sub-
stance and effect at or about the time alleged. Failure 
of the trial court so to do after the matter was called 
to its nttention constitutes reversible error. 
Immediately after the parties had rested, and prior 
to the submission of requested instructions, counsel for 
Plaintiff in a discussion with the court and opposing 
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counsel stated that Plaintiff wanted the court specifically 
to instruct the jury that when a statement was made by 
Defendant as to any matter, such statement would be 
continuing and remain until such time as Defendant 
retracted the statement or Plaintiff became aware of the 
true facts (Tr. 563). Subsequently, Plaintiff requested 
such an instruction of the court (R. 43). Although the 
Requested Instruction (Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
No. 12) is marked "given in substance" by the court, 
such instruction was not given in substance, nor did 
the court instruct the jury on Plaintiff's theory of the 
case in this respect. 
During the course of the trial counsel for Defendant 
maintained that with respect to statements made by Mr. 
Duvall in the spring of 1950 as to the value or gold 
content of the ore, cost of mining and milling, and per-
cent of recovery were first of all based upon the Engi-
neer's report and at any event were statements con-
cerning a future, rather than a presently existing fact. 
However, the mine went into production in September 
1950, and immediately thereafter it became apparent to 
Mr. Duvall that the ore was considerably lower in gold 
content than $7.00 per ton, to-wit: approximately $4.50 
per ton; that only one-third of the gold was being re-
covered from the ore; and that it was costing in excess 
of $6.28 per ton to extract the gold (not including 
depreciation, depletion and royalty). ( Exhs. H and I, 
Tr. 101) 
Even assuming, for the purpose of argument, that 
when Mr. Duvall approached Dr. Douglas to loan the 
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Duvall Mining Company $20,000.00, in the spring of 
1950, that from the best source of information available 
it appeared that there were 200,000 tons of ore, averag-
ing $7.00 per ton available; that it would cost only $3.28 
per ton to mine and mill the ore, and that it would be 
possible to extract 90% of the gold from the ore, never-
theless by the time Mr. Duvall approached Dr. Douglas 
in December 1950 and asked the latter to mortgage his 
home and loan the Company another $15,000.00, it was 
then apparent to l\Ir. Duvall that all the previous infor-
mation furnished to Dr. Douglas was false and Defendant 
then and there had the duty to disclose to the Plaintiff 
the true facts with respect to assay Yalues, per cent of 
recovery and production costs. His failure to do so 
constituted a re-affirmation of the previous statements 
and representations and a fraud upon Plaintiffs. 
The principle of law involved is well stated in the 
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 3, Sec. 551, as 
follows: 
'' ( 2) One party to a business transaction is 
under a duty to exercise reasonable care to dis-
close to the other before the transaction is con-
summated 
(a) such matters as the other is entitled to 
kno"\v because of a fiduciary or other 
similar relation of trust and confidence 
hPt"·c·t)n them, 
(b) au.11 s u bseq u cntly acquired -information 
1ch ich h c rcco gn iz·c s as Jnaking untrue or 
Jn£slcad iug a JH~e v-ious representation 
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(c) 
which when made was true or believed to 
be so, 
the falsity of a misrepresentation which 
\Yhen made was not made for the purpose 
of its being acted upon if he subsequently 
ascertains that the other is a bout to act 
in reliance upon it in a transaction with 
him.'' (Italics added) 
In discussing the applicability of Sub-paragraph 
2(b ), the following illustration, appropro of the present 
situation, is given: 
'' 2. A, the president of a mercantile corpora-
tion, makes a true statement of its financial posi-
tion to a credit rating company intending the 
substance of it to be published by it to its sub-
scribers as is done. The corporation's financial 
position becomes seriously impaired but A does 
not inform the credit rating company of this fact. 
The corporation receives goods on credit from B, 
a subscriber of the rating company, who when the 
goods are bought is relying, as A knows, on the 
credit rating based on his statements to the rating 
company. A is liable in deceit to B.'' 
There is a presumption in law which arises that once 
a fact or condition is shown to exist it continues to remain 
in existence until the contrary is shown, or until a dif-
ferent presumption is raised from the nature of the 
subject in question. (See 20 Am. Jur., EVIDENCE, Sec. 
207, p. 205.) But whether you apply the principle that 
the matters reported to Dr. and Mrs. Douglas in March, 
1950 would be presumed to continue until they had been 
advised to the contrary, or whether you apply the prin-
ciples enunciated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 
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the result is the same-the court should have instructed 
the jury in respect to the matter, as requested by Plain-
tiffs or otherwise, as long as the theory was properly 
outlined. 
On the cross-examination of Dr. Douglas, he was 
asked by counsel for the Defendant whether or not he 
continued to serve as a director of the Company during 
the period of time that the mine was in operation. Dr. 
Douglas answered that he did not know whether he was 
or was not a director, although he attended directors' 
meetings in good faith "thinking I was a director, but 
after the mine shut down I went to Lawrence Malan's 
office ... '' At that time he was interrupted by counsel, 
who said that "I am not questioning whether you were 
a director or not, you thought you were a director and 
purported to act as a director''' (Tr. 84) The only other 
testimony in the record to the effect that the Plaintiff 
Douglas ever appeared to be a director in the Duvall 
Mining Company appears in the testimony of Mr. Duvall 
who testified that Dr. Douglas had been appointed to the 
Board of Directors in December of 1950 and thereafter 
elected to serve on the Board at subsequent stockholders 
meetings. (Tr. 435, 436) 
Upon further cross-examination, Plaintiff answered: 
'' Q. Did you as a director eYer seek to inform 
~~ourself lll\yond the information you received 
ft·om 1\lr. Duvnll as to the rompany,s operations 
and ho\\~ it "~as doing-1 
" ·\ ~ro 
.A • ...l' • 
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'' Q. Never made any inquiry as a director? 
"A. No. 
"Q. I take it that at these directors' meetings 
which you attended the operations of the company 
were discussed and considered by the directors? 
''A. They were discussed some. 
'' Q. Yes. And I take it that the need of the 
company to make additional borrowing was dis-
cussed at those directors' meetings¥ 
''A. At one or two of them that was discussed, 
that I attended. You realize that the last three, 
one was on the night he told me everything was 
over, and the other one was after it closed down. 
'' Q. What date did you attend directors' meet-
ings¥ 
''A. I attended them on February 15, Octo-
ber-
"Q. What year, please~ 
"A. 1951; October 10, 1951." (Tr. 84, 85) 
Notwithstanding the dispute as to whether Dr. 
Douglas was or was not a member of the Board of 
Directors, the court in its instructions to the jury stated, 
in commenting that a person should observe and learn 
what a reasonable person should learn and hear: 
" ... and that's especially true, Mrs. Nylander and 
gentlemen, if the person happens to hold the high 
office of a director in a corporation. As a matter 
of law, a director had access-that is, in ordinary 
corporations-to the books and records. He's .one 
of the managers and he's supposed to be on the 
job and acquaint himself with what's going on. 
So in connection with this reliance and with this 
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continuing representation, if any you find, you 
must give consideration as to the question of 
whether this man, whether Mr. Douglas heard 
anything or did anything or saw anything that 
would put him on notice, at least as to subsequent 
transactions." (Tr. 575, 576) 
It is Appellants' contention that not only does this 
instruction in effect advise the jury that Dr. Douglas 
was a member of the Board of Directors, it further 
directs them that as a member of such Board he was 
conclusively presumed to be in possession of all of the 
information that would be available to him if he had 
insisted upon looking at the records and books. It was 
obvious during the course of the trial that the Plaintiff, 
Douglas, did not have access to the records and books 
of the company ; that by reason of the representations 
made to him by the Defendant and the latter's position 
in the community, Plaintiff was induced to rely thereon 
and lulled into a position of not looking elsewhere for 
facts which might have legally been available to him as 
a stockholder in the Du·vall Company. (Tr. 87, 88) In 
any event he did not attend any directors' meetings until 
February, 1951, at \Yhirh time three of the so-called loans 
had been made. Thereafter and during the time that 
the loans were made by him he attended only one other 
meeting of the Board of Directors (October, 1951) so 
that he could not ha Ye been in actual possession of facts 
whieh \vould have put him on notice of the financial 
condition of the compau~~ and the mining operations 
unless ht' had been advised of such matters in the course 
of these meetings. Dr. Douglas testified that he 'yas 
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not so advised. (Tr. 86) Mr. Duvall testified that the 
matters were always brought up at the meetings as to 
the operations of the company and as to how things 
·were getting along. 
We submit that the court should have instructed 
the jury that they were to find whether or not Dr. Doug-
las ·was in fact a member of the Board of Directors; and 
that only if they should find that he was a member, 
would he be required to have knowledge of the facts 
with respect to the condition of the company. Even 
then, if the jury should further find that he was induced 
to rely upon the representations made to him by Mr. 
Duvall so that he made no inquiry and did not examine 
the books and records of the company, he would not be 
charged with knowledge of the true facts. 
This matter was discussed between court and counsel 
prior to instructing the jury where the following com-
ments were made : 
''MR. NIELSEN : I think the court has to 
instruct the jury that the fact that he's a director, 
if it is a fact-
"THE COURT: Does not in and of itself 
alone-
'' ~IR. NIELSEN: -give him knowledge of 
what took place. 
''MR. OLMSTEAD: It doesn't estop him 
from bringing the action. 
'' 1IR. NIELSEN: It didn't impute any facts 
or knowledge to him. 
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"THE COURT: Well, it puts him in a posi-
tion so he can obtain information reasonably. 
''MR. WALLER: But it doesn't impute any 
to him, Judge. 
''THE COURT: It puts him in a position to 
get something. 
''MR. NIELSEN : Not any more than a stock-
holder, Judge. 
''THE COURT: A director is a pretty power-
ful guy. 
"MR. CAMPBELL: He doesn't have a duty 
as a stockholder . to find it out.'' ( Tr. 565) 
The court failed properly to instruct the jury on 
this matter so that Plaintiffs respectfully urge that such 
action was error, requiring a reversal of the judgment 
and the granting of a new trial. 
III 
THE COURT ERRED IN CO~fl\1ENTING UPON 
THE EVIDENCE DURING THE COURSE OF ITS 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
Perhaps one of the reasons 'vhy the Court's instruc-
tions in this case are brought into question is due to the 
fact that the Trial Court instructed the jury orally 
immediately at the close of the evidence and then had 
such instructions reduced to 'vriting and given to the 
jury the following morning 'vhen it ''Tent to the jury 
room after the closing arguments of counsel. There is 
no doubt that the trial court "~as some,vhat hurried and 
this may necount for the failure adequately to cover the 
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issues involved and correctly and specifically to give the 
instructions on the law as it applied to the case. The 
giving of oral instructions tends to open the door to 
comments by the court with respect to the evidence. 
Certainly such was the present situation, and the trial 
court in at least two instances made comments that, 
Appellants respectfully urge, so invaded the province 
of the jury in respect to the weight to be given to the 
evidence as to require a new trial. The law in this State 
for many years has been, and now is, that in giving its 
instructions to the jury the court ''shall not comment 
on the evidence in the case.'' (See former Section 104-
24-14, U.C.A., 1943) The foregoing rule is now stated 
as a part of Rule 51, U.R.C.P. 
The comments of the trial court, which are claimed 
to be error by Appellants, are in substance: First, the 
trial court, while referring to the fact that the jury may 
or may not determine that the representations, if any 
made, were of a continuing nature, went on to say: 
"In this connection, however, I charge you 
that a man can't plug up his ears and not observe 
wha-t a reasonable person should observe and not 
learn what a reasonable person should learn, and 
not hear what was said, if anything was said, con-
cerning the operation of this Company. And 
that's especially true, Mrs. Nylander and gentle·-
men, if the person happens to hold the high office 
of a director in a corporation. As a matter of law, 
a director has access-that is, in ordinary cor-
porations-to the books and records. He's one 
of the managers and he's supposed to be on the 
job and acquaint himself with what's going on.'' 
(Italics added) 
31 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Again, immediately following the above comment 
the court went on to say: 
"Now, if you find that something like that 
happened, of the nature that a reasonable man 
ought to act on, then you can't award judgment 
on some representation, because a man can't blow 
hot and cold. He either relies or he doesn't rely, 
and he sees the sun come up in the morning or he 
doesn't see the sun come up in the morning. If 
he hears certain things he hears certain things, 
and if he sees a report he sees a report, and he's 
charged with "That's in there.'' (Italics added) 
The effect of these statements was to impress the 
jury with the fact that they were to resol\e the questions 
in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiffs upon 
the ground and for the reason that the Court believed 
that the Plaintiffs had knowledge of the affairs of the 
corporation or had closed their eyes to information 
which was available to them. The court did not leave it 
up to the jury to decide whether they did have such 
knowledge, but in effect instructed them that Plaintiffs 
had seen or observed the books and records of the com-
pan~~ and had heard and learned of the financial condi-
tion of the company during the time the loans "\vere being 
made. 
Actually, Plaintiffs could not have known of the 
financial position of the company during the spring, 
summer, and fall of 1950. There is no claim made that 
they sa \Y auy financial report, that the records and books 
of the company "\V('re up to date, or that any 'Yritten 
report of assays of the ore "\\Tl~re made during that period 
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of time. No claim is even made by the Defendant that 
Dr. Douglas was a director during this period of time 
nor that he saw or had access to the records and books 
of the Company. Thus for such period of time the court, 
as a matter of law, should have instructed the jury that 
he did not see, hear or learn that the representations 
made to him by the Defendant, Duvall, were false repre-
sentations of fact. 
The law with respect to commenting on the evidence 
is ·well stated. In 3 Am. Jur. APPEAL AND ERROR, 
Section 1055, p. 606, as follows : 
''Generally speaking, the sufficiency of the 
evidence must be left to the jury. It is reversible 
error for the court to overstep the limits of the 
rule in the particular jurisdiction in its comments 
on the evidence, especially comments on the weight 
and sufficiency of the evidence, at least if injury 
results therefrom. There is frequently a question 
in the individual case as to whether what was said 
amounted to a comment on the evidence within 
the prohibition of the rule.'' 
This court, in the case of State vs. Green, 77 Utah 
580, 6 Pac. 2(d) 177, made the following statement with 
respect to commenting on the evidence : 
"There can be no serious doubt but that it was 
error to give instruction No. 3 and that part of 
instruction No. 4 which we have quoted. In this 
jurisdiction the trial judge is not permitted to 
comment on the evidence, much less may he indi-
cate to the jttry that some material facts, not ad-
mitted at the trial, are established beyond contro-
versy. It is the sole and exclusive province of the 
jury to determine the facts in all criminal cases, 
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whether the evidence offered by the state is weak 
or strong, is in conflict or is not controverted. 
Evidence may be ever so convincing that an 
accused is guilty of the crime charged, yet, it is 
for the jury and not for the trial judge to render 
the verdict. If the trial judge may not find a 
verdict of guilty, so, likewise he may not find any 
of the facts which are necessary elements of the 
crime for which the accused is being tried.'' 
(Italics added) 
In a North Carolina case of In Re Bartlett's Will, 
70 S.E. 2(d) 482, the court observed: 
''The founders of our legal system intended 
that the right of trial by jury, whether constitu-
tional or statutory in origin, should be a. vital 
force rather than an empty form in the adminis-
tration of justice. They realize that this could not 
be if the petit jury should become a mere unthink-
ing echo of the judge's will. To forestall such 
eventuality·, they clearly demarkated the respec-
tive functions of the judge and the jury in both 
civil and criminal trials in a familiar statute, 
which was enacted in 1796, and which originally 
bore this caption : ' .... ~n Act to Secure the Impar-
tiality of Trial by Jury, and to Direct the Conduct 
of Judges in Charges to the Petit Jury'." 
The statute referred to stated that "no judge shall 
give an opinion to the jury in his charge to the jury, 
'\\rhether or not a fact is fully or sufficiently proven, that 
being the true office and province of the jury.'' 
The court ,,~(;_•nt on to say: 
"rrhis 8tntute iR designed to make effectual 
the right of ever~~ litigant 'to ha,~e his eause con-
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sidered with the cold neutrality of the impartial 
judge', and the equally unbiased mind of a prop-
erly instructed jury. Withers vs. Lane, 144 N. C. 
184, 56 S. E. 855. '' 
We respectfully submit that the foregoing comments 
to the jury were such as to prejudice the Plaintiffs in 
obtaining a fair trial. The trial judge himself appeared 
to recognize the impropriety of his comments for he 
stated to the jury immediately following that: 
"Well, I may want to correct this a little bit 
tomorrow morning. We'll see." (Tr. 576) 
However, nothing was done to correct the impres-
sion given to the jury. 
IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
COUNSEL TO READ FROM A TRANSCRIPT OF 
TESTIMONY IN FINAL ARGUMENT. 
While there were a number of witnesses called both 
on behalf of the Plaintiffs and Defendant in this case 
the principal witnesses, who gave the most crucial testi-
mony in the case, were the Plaintiff, Dr. Douglas and 
the Defendant, Mr. Duvall. For this reason, it is obvious 
that in order to present the matter fully and accurately 
to the jury after a week of trial, a transcript of Mr. 
Duvall's testimony on examination of him as a part of 
Plaintiffs' evidence-in-chief, would be desirable and 
effective in arguing the case to the jury. For this reason, 
a transcript of such testimony was ordered early in the 
course of the trial and such fact was well known to 
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counsel for Defendant, who could have, if they so desired, 
ordered a similar transcript or a transcript of the testi-
mony of Dr. Douglas. Because counsel for the Plaintiff 
intended to read the transcript of such testimony to the 
jury in the course of his argument, the specific matters 
with respect to the admissions made by Mr. Duvall as 
to his statements during the original conversation be-
tween him and Dr. Douglas in March of 1950, as well as 
his knowledge with respect to the representations made 
on that occasion and subsequently, was not digested and 
summarized for the purpose of presenting it to the jury 
in narrative form. 
When counsel for Plaintiff made his opening remarks 
to the jury, he advised them that because the trial had 
been long and involved and because it would be difficult 
to remember the testimony which had been presented on 
behalf of Plaintiffs' Complaint at the beginning of the 
trial, he desired to read to them some of the testimony 
of the Defendant, Duvall, and particularly that portion 
of his testimony ''Thich had been elicited on examination 
by counsel as a part of the Plaintiffs' case. Immediately 
counsel for the Defendant arose to his feet and stated: 
'' l\lR. YOUNG: I hesitate to interrupt counsel 
in his argument, but at this time the defendant 
desires to take Pxeeption to the statement of 
counsel, and particularly to an:~ attempt, as indi-
eat<-)d hr his statement, that he has had transcribed 
and "\Yill read to this jury excerpts of testimony 
'"hieh hn,Tt) been giYen. In our opinion that would 
be highl~T prejudieial. The jury are here to try all 
the facts, and You cannot read eYen from a depo-
sition. lt 's a question of the Jury remembering 
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the evidence and it would unduly emphasize cer-
tain parts of the evidence, and we object at this 
time and ask the court to instruct counsel that 
such conduct would be prejudicial. 
''MR. NIELSEN : Well, if your Honor please, 
I'm sure I'm entitled to read just as the jury, if 
they want to hear any of the testimony, are 
entitled to have any of it read to them. There's 
nothing any court has ever said that counsel can't 
either recall it specifically from memory or by 
the written word." (Tr. 582, 583) 
It is interesting to note that Mr. Young (Defendant's 
attorney) apparently was under the impression that as 
a matter of law it was impossible to read from any 
transcript of testimony in argument to the jury. This 
also appeared to be the Court's view of the matter, for 
when counsel for the Plaintiff stated that there was 
nothing in the law that would require the court to pro-
hibit counsel from reading from the transcript the court 
stated: 
"THE COURT: That hasn't been our ground 
rule up in the far country up here.'' ( Tr. 583) 
As Nir. Young indicated the reading the testimony 
of Mr. Duvall to the jury would of course impress the 
members and help them to recall the testimony which 
had been presented in the early days of the trial to weigh 
it against the testimony introduced by Defendant during 
the subsequent days of the trial. This certainly would 
have been of considerable value to the jury in refreshing 
the recollections of the individual jurors. The trial 
I 
judge, however, concluded that he did not have a right 
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to allow counsel to read from the testimony and there-
fore ruled against Plaintiff, the following conversation 
taking place : 
''MR. NIELSEN : Well, of course, if your 
Honor says I can't read it to them I won't. 
''THE COURT: I may be in error. I hesitate 
to let you start reading from excerpts. 
''MR. NIELSEN: If your Honor says I can't 
I won't, but I will take exception to the Court's 
refusal to let me read it. 
"THE COURT: That's understood." (Tr. 
583) 
The law is well settled that while the trial court has 
discretion in a particular case to control the conduct of 
counsel during the closing argument, nevertheless it is 
equally well settled that counsel should be allowed to 
read from the testimony of the witnesses if read from 
the official transcript. The rule is stated in 53 Am. Jur. 
TRIAL, Sec. 463, p. 368, as follows : 
'' 'Vhile arguments of counsel are required to 
be confined to the issues in the cases on trial, the 
evidence and fair and reasonable deductions there-
from, and to arguments of opposing counsel, gen-
erally speaking, liberal freedom of speech should 
be allo" .. ed. There are no hard-and-fast limitations 
\Yithin "Thich the argument of earnest counsel 
must be eonfined-no "Tell-defined bounds beyond 
\Yhich the eloquence of an adYoeate shall not soar. 
l-Ie ma~T di~cuss the facts proved or admitted in 
thP pleadings, arraign the conduct of the parties, 
and nttack the credibility of \Yitnesses. He may 
indulge in oratorical co~ceit or flourish and in 
illustrations and metaphorical allusions. He ·ma,y 
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repeat the evidence verbatim for _the _purpo_se ~~ 
commenting on it in the connecttton ttn whtch ~t 
~vas introduced at the trial, or he may refresh h~s 
recollection of the testimony by reading from the 
notes of the official reporter." (Italics added) 
In the case of State v. Burns, 148 Mo. 167, 49 S.W. 
1005, the court stated: 
"Counsel for the State did not transcend the 
evidence in alluding to the impeaching testimony 
of the witness Clara Hunter. He repeated her 
evidence verbatim in commenting upon the evi-
dence of Defenda-nt's mother. It was legitimate 
for that purpose, and was employed in that way 
only." (Italics added) 
In Gephart v. Stout, 11 Wn. (2d) 184, 118 P. (2d) 
801, the action of the trial court in permitting Plaintiff's 
counsel to read to the jury a portion of the testimony of 
certain witnesses from a transcript of the evidence, over 
Defendant's objection that the whole of the evidence of 
the witness should be read, was held not to be an abuse 
of discretion. 
See also: Aasen v. Aasen, 228 Minn. 1, 36 N.W. 2d 
27; Bonderson v. Hovde, 150 Minn. 175, 184 N.W. 853; 
Killam v. Travelers Protective Ass 'n. of America, (Mis-
souri 1939) 127 S.W. 2d 772; State v. Perkins, 143 Ia. 
55, 120 N.W. 62. 
In the recent case of Westling v. Holm., (Minnesota), 
58 N.W. 2d 252, counsel began to read from a transcript 
of the testimony, stating, ''And here is the precise 
testimony on that point,'' whereupon the court ruled 
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that he could not read from the paper "as a transcript" 
but allowed counsel to read the material as being his 
''absolute, honest, true and correct recollection of the 
evidence.'' On appeal error was assigned is not per-
mitting counsel to read from the "transcript" as the 
official transcript of the evidence. In passing on the 
point the court held: 
''Whether the trial court abused this discretion 
by directing counsel not to refer to the document 
as a 'transcript' would not seem to be material 
here. Counsel read portions of the testimony 
which he deemed material, and in view of the 
repeated references to the document as a tran-
script as outlined above, there can be little doubt 
that the jury was a\Yare that it was from the court 
reporter's transcript of the testimony. It follows 
that no prejudice resulted from the ruling.'' 
In the instant matter counsel was not allowed to 
read from the document as the transcript of testimony 
or otherwise and therefore the error of the trial court 
,,~as prejudicial. The Yery effect of the court's ruling on 
the jury "~as such as to preclude them from requesting 
that their recollection be refreshed as to the testimony 
given during the first days of the trial. 
\T 
TliE COlTRT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
DIRECul, 1\ \..-ER.DIC~T IN F_A __ \TOR OF THE PLAIN-
r~riFF~ lTPON .AJJ..J ()R. P.A.RT OF PL.AINTIFFS' 
C01iP1.~l\ I NT. 
A8 one of tht)ir R.equested Instructions Appellants 
rt\questPd the eourt to direct a Yerdict in fayor of Plain-
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tiffs and against the Defendant on the complaint. (R. 33) 
In addition, Plaintiff made a motion for a directed verdict 
in respect to the loan made by Plaintiffs to the Duvall 
~lining Company on December 4, 1950, as follows : 
"MR. NIELSEN: I have a motion that I 
,vould like to make. We move that the court direct 
the jury as a matter of law to return a verdict 
upon the transaction referred to in Exhibit ''X'' 
as transaction ... three ... upon the ground and 
for the reason that the evidence as a matter of 
law shows that at that time the defendant was 
'"rithin and in possession of knowledge \\~hich he 
failed to impart to the plaintiff in any \Yay chang-
ing or correcting the evidence \Yhich he himself 
gave that he had previously represented to the 
plaintiff, that according to the reports of the 
engineers and otherwise, that the ore to be pro-
duced from said mine \vould be of a value of 
approximately seven dollars per ton, when on 
December 4, 1950, he in truth and in fact knew 
that the value of such ore did not exceed approxi-
mately five dollars per ton; and upon the further 
fact that the evidence is undisputed that he knew 
at that time that the cost of producing the gold 
from the ore \Yas in excess of nine dollars per ton 
and that he had failed to retract or change his 
previous representation that it would not cost in 
excess of three dollars and fifty cents per ton to 
produce the gold from such ore.'' ( Tr. 590, 591) 
Appellants' position and contention with respect to 
this point is somewhat related to the argument made that 
the Court was under the duty to instruct the jury with 
respect to the continuing nature of any representations 
in the absence of any retraction on the part of Defendant 
or knowledge of a change of conditions on the part of 
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Plaintiffs. While it is not Appellants' intention to argue 
at this time that the trial court should have directed a 
verdict for Plaintiffs on the entire complaint, it is re-
spectfully urged that the trial court should have directed 
a verdict as to the specific loan made on December 4 
' 1950. In making this contention Appellants rely pri-
marily upon the testimony of the Defendant Duvall, 
although the testimony of Plaintiffs' witnesses certainly 
support and sustain such position. 
During the presentation of Plaintiffs' evidence, the 
Defendant Duvall was called to be examined under the 
provisions of Rule 43(b), U.R.C.P. Previously Dr. 
Douglas had testified that when Mr. Duvall had called 
the Doug lases into Duvall's office in the Ogden First 
Federal Savings and Loan Association, Duvall had told 
the Plaintiffs in substance and effect that "they had 
already blocked out and diamond drilled 300,000 tons 
of ore ranging in price from about three and a half or 
four dollars a ton up to fifteen or sixteen, and he showed 
me a blue print "Tith those figures on and intermittently 
there were figures like nine something and eleven some-
thing, and he said, 'It eYen has gold that assays as high 
as $50 a ton;' '' ( Tr. ~8) that the ore aTe raged seven or 
eight dollars per ton: (Tr. 30) and that "the entire cost 
of produeing this ore "Tould be in the neighborhood of 
t"·o nn< I a half to three and a half dollars a ton, the 
entire cost.'' (Tr. 31) 
I)lnintiff further testified that in the early part of 
DeePinher ln50 1\Ir. DuYnll asked Plaintiff to come to 
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Duvall's office in the Ogden First Federal where Duvall 
stated they "were going to expand the operation and 
they were going to need new equipment and they were 
going to have to raise some money"; (Tr. 36) that 
Duvall would loan Plaintiffs $15,000 on their home; ( Tr. 
37) that Plaintiff borrowed the money and loaned it to 
the Duvall Company because of the previous, as well as 
the immediate, representations made to them. (Tr. 88) 
Plaintiff further testified that subsequent to the 
first conversation which took place in March 1950, Mr. 
Duvall never changed or contradicted the original repre-
sentation as to the amount of ore blocked out, or the 
cost of producing the gold from the ore, or the value of 
the ore being produced; (Tr. 53) that at all times when 
making the loans to the Duvall Mining Company Plain-
tiff relied on Mr. Duvall's judgment as a banker, and 
had in mind the original representations which Mr. 
Duvall had made concerning the quantity of ore and the 
cost of producing it; that this information, together with 
the other representations subsequently made, induced the 
various loans. ( Tr. 88, 89) 
Defendant's version of the original conversation 
which took place in his office in March 1950 was some-
what different in that Defendant testified that he showed 
the engineer's report (Defendant's Exh. 2) to Dr. Doug-
las and went over it in some detail; that Defendant relied 
on the report and that the blue print testified to by Dr. 
Douglas was prepared by Mr. Romney and contained 
result of ore sampling. ( Tr. 411, 412, 422). With respect 
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to the loan made in December 1950, Mr. Duvall testified 
that "at that particular time it was concluded that 
changes would be necessary in the plant and that we 
would have to make some changes and improvements 
and that the money would undoubtedly be needed, and 
perhaps the money may have been needed in connection 
with work that had already been done. I do not remember 
the details completely of that conversation." (Tr. 430) 
He further testified, after counsel for Defendant asked 
him if he recalled discussing with Dr. Douglas anything 
in connection with the loan that "if I remember cor-
rectly, Dr. Douglas stated that in order to make the 
company a loan he would have to borrow money upon 
his home, and a discussion took place in connection with 
that; and I did agree, if I remember the dates and the 
time correctly, that I did make him a loan with which 
to loan this money to the company ; a loan upon his 
home." (Tr. 431) 
Following this answer, he was again asked by his 
counsel: 
'' Q. Do you recall in particular any specific 
statements that 'vere made by you to him at or 
a bout this time and in connection with this loan?'' 
To Y{hich he replied: 
''A. I do not recall in detail the statements 
thn t ,,,.ere made to him." 
We nre therefore left to the unescapable conclusion 
that Defendant did not bring to the attention of Dr. 
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Douglas Defendant's knowledge of what had taken place 
at the mine during the summer of 1950, and particularly 
Defendant did not change or correct the representations 
made in 1\'Iarch 1950-whether such representations were 
as contained in the engineer's report or as testified to 
by Dr. Douglas. 
As to his familiarity with conditions during the 
summer and fall of 1950, Defendant testified that he was 
familiar with activities from month to month; (Tr. 101) 
that Mr. Romney was keeping a day to day record which 
was available to Defendant and which he saw frequently; 
(Tr. 103) that he knew that the Company was not re-
ceiving more than about $2.00 per ton out of the ore 
being produced; that "it was not a good recovery"; and 
that he knew when he approached Dr. Douglas for a 
loan in December 1950 that the company had sustained 
an operating loss (before depreciation and depletion) or 
something like $21,537.44. (Tr. 104) He further admitted 
that he was familiar with the information contained on 
Exhibits H, I, and J during the course of the summer 
and fall of 1950; that daily records were kept by Mr. 
Romney at the mine which he saw at least once a week 
(Tr. 115). He further testified on cross-examination that 
when the loan was made on December 4, 1950 he '' cer-
tainly knew that the recovery on the ores and the receipts 
from the smelter were not equalling the expenses that 
we were paying out for equipment and operations,'' ( Tr. 
142) and that "I knew that we were not receiving suffi-
cient funds to pay the operating costs." ( Tr. 505) 
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Plaintiffs' Exhibit M further illustrates what the 
operations were in the year 1950, as well as in subsequent 
years was corroborated by Mr. Romney {Tr. 370). 
After having testified in substance as outlined above, 
the Defendant further testified, upon being pressed by 
counsel on cross-examination, as follows: 
'' Q. Now, Mr. Duvall, you previously testified 
that as early as the first shipment in September 
and October of 1950, you realized then how much 
you were getting out of the ore you were pro-
ducing, did you not~ 
'' .L\_. September and October of 1950 ~ 
''Q. Yes. 
' 'A. Well, in September of 1950 were the first 
few shipments, and October. And we realized 
that those shipments were not, certainly not ninety 
per cent or anywhere near that. 
''Q. And you kne"T at that time that the assays 
of the ore that was going into the tanks was less 
than $5.00 per ton, didn't you~ 
''A. I don't remember the exact amount of 
that, but there were variations in the body of ore 
as to values, so that might not have concerned us 
too much if we were starting on a point that was 
in what we term lower or higher grade areas. 
'' Q. But you did kno"'.,. that the checks that 
you were writing out were considerably more than 
what you 'Yere bringing in in terms of Yalues of 
the gold, V{eren 't they~ 
"..:\. Very definitely. 
'' Q. And so by the time the mine shut down 
about the last of November or the first of Decem-
46 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
her, you were confronted with the situation of 
having to raise about $15,000 to $25,000 to pay 
the bills that were outstanding for that year's 
operation, weren't you~ 
"A. That is probably true. 
"Q. And it's a fact, is it not, Mr. Duvall, that 
you didn't tell Mr. Douglas, when he came in and 
you asked him to mortgage his home to you on or 
about December 4, that the reason you wanted 
this money was to pay these bills because the 
operation was a losing proposition in 1950~ Just 
answer that if you did or did not tell him. 
"A. I can't answer that, whether I did or did 
not, without an explanation.'' 
The foregoing testimony clearly puts this situation 
within the specific language of Section 551, subsection 
(2) (b) and the accompanying illustration, contained in 
the Restatement on the Law of Torts. We therefore 
submit that the court should have so directed the jury 
to return a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs at least on the 
loan made by them on December 4, 1950. As previously 
stated the court should have made further directions to 
the jury which would have limited the issues to be re-
solved by the jury on the other loans made. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the 
trial court should have directed a verdict in Plaintiffs' 
favor as to the loan made in December 1950 and should 
have submitted the remainder of the case to the jury on 
instructions which would have limited the issues to be 
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decided. In so doing the court should not have submitted 
the case to the jury on detailed written interrogatories, 
allowing them to speculate on issues concerning which 
there was no dispute in the evidence. Too, the court 
failed properly to instruct the jury on finding the repre-
sentations to have been made substantially as alleged 
and improperly commented on the evidence during the 
giving of the instructions. The court likewise failed to 
instruct the jury with respect to the duty of the De-
fendant to correct or change any statement or represen-
tation subsequently determined to be incorrect. And 
finally, the Court improperly refused permission to 
counsel for the Plaintiffs to read from a transcript of 
the testimony in final argument and summation to the 
Jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
NIELSEN & CONDER 
CLYDE C. WALLER 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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